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Abstract
We calculate explicitly the optimal strategy for an investor with exponential utility func-
tion when the stock price follows an autoregressive Gaussian process. We also calculate its
performance and analyse it when the trading horizon tends to infinity. Dependence of asymp-
totic performance on the autoregression parameter is determined. This provides, to the best
of our knowledge, the first instance of a theorem linking directly the memory of the asset price
process to the attainable satisfaction level of investors trading in the given asset.
MSC (2010): Primary 93E20; Secondary 91G10.
Keywords: expected utility maximization; Gaussian autoregressive process; memory of a
stochastic process
1 Introduction
Sequences of independent random variables have no memory at all, Markovian processes
remember their past through their present value only. In the case of processes with longer
memory the entire past may influence the current evolution of the given stochastic system, e.g.
in the case of fractional Brownian motion and related processes.
Econometric time series exhibit various degrees of influence of the past on the present, de-
pending on the sampling frequency. High-frequency volatility has long-range dependence while
asset prices may or may not have this property, [1]. The principal motivating question of our
research is the following: how does the memory of an asset’s price influence the satisfaction
attainable from investing into this asset ?
The present paper concentrates on a Markovian setting. It precisely characterizes the depen-
dence of performance on memory in a concrete model class where the price follows a Gaussian
autoregressive processes. In the case of investors with exponential utility we find the optimal
trading strategy for each finite time horizon and analyse what happens when the horizon tends
to infinity. We determine the exact dependence of the asymptotic performance on the autore-
gression parameter and hence make the first step towards general results linking investment
performance to the memory length of the underlying security price.
The present paper continues previous investigations of [3, 4, 5], where asymptotic arbitrage
in the utility sense was considered, i.e. the speed of the expected utility growth when the time
horizon tends to infinity. The first two references concentrated on continuous-time models, [5]
treated a model where borrowing and short-selling were forbidden and utility functions were
defined on the positive axis only.
The possibly negative prices of the model we consider may be acceptable in certain contexts
(e.g. futures trading). Its parameters may also be tuned such that negative prices practically
never occur. We nonetheless stress that our purpose is to exhibit a theoretical model whose
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qualitative conclusions are hoped to extend to a broader class of processes in the future so we
are not bothered by the eventual negativity of prices.
We stress that it occurs very rarely that optimal strategies can be determined in closed form
for discrete-time investment problems. As far as we know our paper is the first to have found
the explicit solution for the case of autoregressive Gaussian processes.
In the present section we explain our model and the optimisation problem in consideration.
In Section 2 we present our results, Section 3 contains the proofs.
We are working with a financial market in which two assets are traded: a riskless asset
with price constant 1, and a single risky asset whose price Xt is an R-valued stochastic process
governed by the equation
Xt+1 = αXt + σεt+1, t ≥ 0, (1)
where α ∈ R, σ > 0 are parameters and εt are i.i.d. standard Gaussian, independent of X0.
Introducing β := α− 1, we may rewrite (1) as
Xt+1 −Xt = βXt + σεt+1, t ≥ 0. (2)
The information flow is given by
Ft := σ(Xs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t). (3)
We interpret α (or, equivalently, β) as a “memory parameter” indicating how previous values of
the process Xinfluence its present value. Eventually, our purpose is to find the dependence of
maximal achievable utility on this parameter.
A trading strategy is described by the number of units in the risky asset at t, denoted by φt
for t ≥ 1. Trading strategies are assumed (Ft)t≥0-predictable R-valued processes (i.e. φt is Ft−1-
measurable for all t), in particular, short-selling is allowed. The totality of trading strategies is
denoted by Φ.
The wealth process corresponding to a given trading strategy (φt)t≥1 is
Lφt := L
φ
t−1 + φt(Xt −Xt−1), t ≥ 1, (4)
where Lφ0 := L0 is the initial capital of the investor. In other words, the terminal wealth of the
investor is given by
LφT = L0 +
T∑
j=1
φj(Xj −Xj−1), (5)
where T ≥ 1 is a time horizon.
We focus on a finite horizon utility maximization problem and look for the optimal strategy
(φ∗t )1≤t≤T which satisfies
sup
φ∈Φ
EU
(
LφT
)
= EU
(
Lφ
∗
T
)
, (6)
where U : R → R is the utility function U(x) = −e−x. Note that the expectations exist but may
be −∞. We are going to give an explicit solution for this problem.
In order to make a comparison, we also consider an investor who is not using the accumulated
past information, i.e. we define Φ0 as the set of trading strategies for which φt is F0-measurable
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . We wish to find η∗ ∈ Φ0 such that
sup
φ∈Φ0
EU
(
LφT
)
= EU
(
Lη
∗
T
)
.
We may and will suppose L0 = 0 in the sequel.
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2 Results
Theorem 2.1. 1. The optimal strategies for time horizon T ∈ N are (φ∗t )1≤t≤T := (φˆTt (Xt−1))1≤t≤T
when past information is used and (η∗t )1≤t≤T := (φˆ
T
t (X0))1≤t≤T when past information is ig-
nored where
φˆTt (z) =
βz
σ2
θTt for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and z ∈ R, (7)
and θTt = 1− (T − t)β.
2. Using these strategies, the maximal conditional expected utilities are
E
[
U
(
Lφ
∗
T
)
|X0 = z
]
= − 1√
γβ(T )
e−
β2z2
2σ2
T
, and (8)
and
E
[
U
(
Lη
∗
T
)
|X0 = z
]
= −e−β
2z2
2σ2
T , (9)
respectively, where γβ is given by
γβ(T ) =


β2TΓ( 1
β2
+T )
Γ( 1
β2
)
if β 6= 0,
1 if β = 0,
(10)
and Γ is the well-known gamma function, Γ(x) :=
∫ +∞
0 t
x−1e−tdt.
3. In case of a stable autoregressive process (when |α| < 1, or, equivalently, β ∈ (−2, 0)) assum-
ing that var(Xt) = 1, and X0 is N(0, 1), the maximal expected utility is
E
[
U
(
Lφ
∗
T
)]
= −
√
β + 2
(2− (T − 1)β) γβ(T )
, and (11)
E
[
U
(
Lη
∗
T
)]
= −
√
β + 2
(2− (T − 1)β) . (12)
4. The asymptotic behaviour of γβ is limT→+∞
γβ(T )
hβ(T )
= 1 where
hβ(T ) =

 Γ
(
1
β2
) (
β2
)1− 1
β2
√
2π
(
T − 1 + 1
β2
)(
1+(T−1)β2
e
)T−1+ 1
β2
if β 6= 0,
1 if β = 0.
(13)
Our conclusion is that using accumulated past information leads to a qualitatively better
strategy (i.e. the expected utility using past information is the expected utility without past
information times a factor tending to 0 much faster than that). In order to make a meaningful
comparison, however, we should normalize our processes. Hence in 3. above we assume stability
and choose X0 in such a way that Xt, t ∈ N becomes stationary with EX2t = 1. We obtain the
maximal expected utilities both with and without past information. They show that an increase
in β leads to an increase in (11) and (12), so more information from the past (represented by
lager |β|) leads to better performance. This platitude is, however, supported by precise formulae
in the present case. Note also that γβ is continuous at β = 0 as well.
3 Computations and proofs
The following lemma will help to construct the optimal strategy φ∗ inductively.
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Lemma 3.1. Let φ˜t, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 be a trading strategy up to time T − 1 given by φ˜t =
ft(X0, . . . ,Xt−1) with Borel functions ft. If φ˜ is optimal up to T − 1, i.e. for all strategies φt,
t = 1, . . . , T − 1 one has
E
[
U(LφT−1)|F0
]
≤ E
[
U(Lφ˜T−1)|F0
]
, (14)
then the strategy defined by φ¯t := ft−1(X1, . . . ,Xt−1), t = 2, . . . , T is optimal between 1 and T , i.e.
for all strategies ψt, t = 2, . . . , T one has
E
[
U
(
T∑
t=2
ψt(Xt −Xt−1)
)
|F1
]
≤ E
[
U
(
T∑
t=2
φ¯t(Xt −Xt−1)
)
|F1
]
. (15)
Proof. Let us denote by ℓ(dyT , . . . , dy2|y1, y0) the conditional law of (XT , . . . ,X2) w.r.t. to X1 = y1,
X0 = y0. We fix a regular version (see III. 70–73 in [2]). As X is a homogeneous Markov chain,
ℓ does not depend on y0 (hence we will write, with a slight abuse of notation, ℓ(dyT , . . . , dy2|y1))
and ℓ(dyT−1, . . . , dy1|y0) is also the density function of (XT−1, . . . ,X1) conditional to X0 = y0
Let ψt = gt(X0, . . . ,Xt−1), t = 2, . . . , T with some Borel functions gt. Define for each z ∈ R the
strategy φt := φt(z) = gt+1(z,X0, . . . ,Xt−1), t = 1, . . . , T − 1. By (14),∫
RT−1
U
(
T−1∑
t=1
gt+1(z, y0, . . . , yt−1)(yt − yt−1)
)
ℓ(dyT−1, . . . , dy1|y0) ≤ (16)
∫
RT−1
U
(
T−1∑
t=1
ft(y0, . . . , yt−1)(yt − yt−1)
)
ℓ(dyT−1, . . . , dy1|y0),
for a.e. y0 (with respect to the law of X0). Note that the right-hand side can be rewritten as∫
RT−1
U
(
T∑
t=2
ft−1(y1, . . . , yt−1)(yt − yt−1)
)
ℓ(dyT , . . . , dy2|y1) = (17)
E
[
U
(
T∑
t=2
φ¯t(Xt −Xt−1)
)
|X1 = y1,X0 = y0
]
,
for a.e. (y1, y0) w.r.t. the law of (X0,X1), note the Markov property again. Similarly, the left-hand
side of (16) equals
∫
RT−1
U
(
T−2∑
t=2
gt(z, y1, . . . , yt−1)(yt − yt−1)
)
ℓ(dyT , . . . , dy2|y1) = (18)
E
[
U
(
T∑
t=2
ψt(Xt −Xt−1)
)
|X1 = y1,X0 = z
]
.
Now plugging in z := y0 we obtain (15) from (16), (17) and (18).
After these preparations we are able to give an explicit solution for the optimal strategies of
the wealth process in case of the price is an autoregressive process.
In this Section we prove Theorem 2.1, first we focus on the case where the investor uses past
information. We consider the case T = 1, so the wealth process according to (4) takes the form
Lφ1 = φ1(X1 −X0) = φ1(βX0 + σε1). (19)
We have
E
[
e−φ1(βX0+σε1)|X0 = z
]
= e−φ1βzE
[
e−φ1σε1
]
= e−φ1βze
φ21σ
2
2 , (20)
hence we get
argmin
φ1
e−φ1βz+
(φ1σ)
2
2 = argmin
φ1
e
1
2(φ1σ−
βz
σ )
2
−
β2z2
2σ2 =
βz
σ2
=
βz
σ2
θ11 = φˆ
1
1(z),
4
because θ11 = 1. So we proved the first part of Theorem 2.1 for T = 1. Now let’s assume that (7)
is true for T − 1, i.e.
φ∗t := φˆ
T−1
t (Xt−1) with φˆ
T−1
t (z) =
βz
σ2
θT−1t 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 (21)
satisfies (6) for all φ ∈ Φ. We will prove that (7) also holds for T . By Lemma 3.1, for all ψ ∈ Φ,
E[e−L
ψ
T |F0] = E[e−ψ1(X1−X0)E[e−
∑T
j=2 ψj(Xj−Xj−1)|F1]|F0] ≥
E[e−ψ1(X1−X0)E[e−
∑T
j=2 φˆ
T−1
j−1 (Xj−1)(Xj−Xj−1)|F1]|F0] =
E[e−ψ1(X1−X0)E[e−
∑T
j=2 φˆ
T
j (Xj−1)(Xj−Xj−1)|F1]|F0], (22)
since φT−1j−1 = φ
T
j . Now define the trading strategy ω = (φ, φˆ
T
2 (X1), . . . , φˆ
T
T (XT−1)) and the
function QT : R
T+2 → R such that
QT (φ,X0, ε) := L
ω
T , where ε = (ε1, . . . εT )
T. (23)
Hence, according to (22), it remains to find φ which minimizes
E
[
e−QT (φ,X0,ε)|X0 = z
]
. (24)
If we prove that φ = φˆT1 (z) does the job then we will be able to conclude that the optimal strategy
for time horizon T is indeed as given in (21) for T − 1.
To compute the minimiser φ we will write QT (φ,X0, ε) in a sum of a quadratic, a linear and a
constant function of ε.
QT (φ,X0, ε) = φ(X1 −X0) +
T∑
j=2
φˆTj (Xj−1)(Xj −Xj−1)
= φ(X1 −X0) +
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
Xj−1(Xj −Xj−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aj
For Aj we have
Aj =
(
αj−1X0 + σ
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1εi
)(
αjX0 + σ
j∑
i=1
αj−iεi − αj−1X0 − σ
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1εi
)
=
(
αj−1X0 + σ
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1εi
)(
αj−1βX0 + σεj + σ
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1βεi
)
= α2j−2βX20 + σβX0
j−1∑
i=1
α2j−i−2εi + σX0α
j−1εj + σ
2
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1εiεj + σβX0
j−1∑
i=1
α2j−i−2εi
+σ2β
(
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1εi
)2
= α2j−2βX20︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1(j)
+2σβX0
j−1∑
i=1
α2j−i−2εi︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2(j)
+σX0α
j−1εj︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3(j)
+σ2
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1εiεj︸ ︷︷ ︸
B4(j)
+σ2β
j−1∑
i=1
j−1∑
k=1
εiεkα
2j−i−k−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B5(j)
.
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Let’s substitute this into QT (φ,X0, ε).
QT (φ,X0, ε) = φ(X1 −X0) +
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
(B1(j) +B2(j) +B3(j) +B4(j) +B5(j))
= φ(βX0 + σε1) +
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
B1(j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1
+
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
B2(j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2
+
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
B3(j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3
+
+
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
B4(j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4
+
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
B5(j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C5
We compute each Cn separately.
C1 =
β2X20
σ2
T∑
j=2
θTj α
2j−2.
C2 =
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
2σβX0
j−1∑
i=1
α2j−i−2εi =
T−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
2β2X0
σ
θTj+1α
2j−iεi
=
T−1∑
i=1
T−1∑
j=i
2β2X0
σ
θTj+1α
2j−iεi =
T−1∑
i=1
εi

T−1∑
j=i
2β2X0
σ
θTj+1α
2j−i

 .
C3 =
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
σX0α
j−1εj =
T∑
j=2
εj
(
βX0
σ
θTj α
j−1
)
.
C4 =
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
σ2
j−1∑
i=1
αj−i−1εiεj =
T∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
εiεj
(
βθTj α
j−i−1
)
.
C5 =
T∑
j=2
βθTj
σ2
σ2β
j−1∑
i=1
j−1∑
k=1
εiεkα
2j−i−k−2 = β2
T−1∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
j∑
k=1
θTj+1εiεkα
2j−i−k
= β2
T−1∑
i=1
T−1∑
j=1
j∑
k=1
θTj+1εiεkα
2j−i−k = β2
T−1∑
i=1

 i∑
k=1
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+1εiεkα
2j−i−k +
T−1∑
k=i+1
T−1∑
j=k
θTj+1εiεkα
2j−i−k


= β2
T−1∑
i=1

 i∑
k=1
εiεk
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+1α
2j−i−k +
T−1∑
k=i+1
εiεk
T−1∑
j=k
θTj+1α
2j−i−k

 .
According to these, we can write QT (φ,X0, ε) as
QT (φ,X0, ε) = ε
T
(
AT − 1
2
I
)
ε+ bT(φ,X0)ε+ c(φ,X0), (25)
where AT = [aik] ∈ RT×T is a symmetric matrix with
aii =
1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+1α
2j−2i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1,
aTT =
1
2
,
aik =
βθTi α
i−k−1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+1α
2j−i−k, 1 ≤ k < i ≤ T − 1,
aTk =
βαT−k−1
2
1 ≤ k ≤ T − 1;
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b : R2 → RT is a vector with
b1(φ,X0) = φσ +
2β2X0
σ
T−1∑
j=1
θTj+1α
2j−1,
bi(φ,X0) =
βX0
σ
θTi α
i−1 +
2β2X0
σ
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+1α
2j−i, 2 ≤ i ≤ T − 1,
bT =
βX0
σ
αT−1;
and c : R2 → R where
c(φ,X0) = φβX0 +
β2X20
σ2
T∑
j=2
θTj α
2j−2.
We need to compute the conditional expected utility given by
E
[
e−QT (φ,X0,ε)|X0 = z
]
=
1(√
2π
)T
∫
RT
e−x
TATx−b
T(φ,z)x−c(φ,z)dx. (26)
In order to evaluate this integral we need some preparation.
We know that
1√
2π
∫
R
e−ax
2−bxdx =
1√
2a
e
b2
4a , (27)
for all b ∈ R and a > 0.
Lemma 3.2. LetD be a positive definite diagonal matrix with diagonal entries d1, d2, . . . , dn, and
let b ∈ Rn. Then
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−x
TDx−bTxdx =
1√
2n detD
e
b
T
D
−1
b
4 . (28)
Proof. Using (27)
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−x
TDx−bTxdx =
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−
∑n
i=1 dix
2
i−
∑n
i=1 bixidx
=
n∏
i=1
1√
2π
∫
R
e−dix
2
i−bixidxi
=
n∏
i=1
1√
2di
e
b2i
4di =
1√
2n detD
e
b
T
D
−1
b
4 .
Lemma 3.3. Let A ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric, positive definite matrix , and b ∈ Rn. Then
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−x
TAx−bTxdx =
1√
2n detA
e
b
T
A
−1
b
4 . (29)
Proof. Since A is symmetric, there is an S orthonormal, and a D diagonal matrix for which
SDS−1 = SDST = A and |detS| = 1. Using Lemma 3.2 and setting y := STx
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−x
TAx−bTxdx =
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−x
TSDSTx−bTxdx =
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−(S
Tx)TDSTx−bTxdx
=
1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−y
TDy−bTSy|detS|dy = 1(√
2π
)n ∫
Rn
e−y
TDy−(STb)Tydy
=
1√
2n detD
e
(STb)TD−1STb
4 =
1√
2n detD
e
b
T
SD
−1
S
T
b
4
=
1√
2n detA
e
b
T
A
−1
b
4 ,
since detD = detA and A−1 = SD−1ST.
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Now we can compute the expression in (26) using Lemma 3.3:
E
[
e−QT (φ,X0,ε)|X0 = z
]
=
1√
2T detAT
e
b
T(φ,z)AT
−1
b(φ,z)
4
−c(φ,z). (30)
We proceed to examining the determinant of AT to prove that AT is positive definite (as (30)
holds only in this case) and we will need to compute one element of the inverse matrix,
(
A−1
)
1,1
.
First we present a lemma which will be very useful later.
Lemma 3.4. For θTt (defined in Theorem 2.1) and for all m ≤ n
n∑
i=m
θTi α
i = (T + 1−m)αm − (T − n)αn+1. (31)
Proof.
n∑
i=m
θTi α
i =
n∑
i=m
(T + 1− i− (T − i)α)αi =
n∑
i=m
(T + 1− i)αi −
n∑
i=m
(T − i)αi+1
=
n∑
i=m
(T + 1− i)αi −
n+1∑
i=m+1
(T + 1− i)αi = (T + 1−m)αm − (T − n)αn+1
Lemma 3.5. For AT = [aij ] we have
a1,n − β
T∑
i=2
ain = 0 for all 2 ≤ n ≤ T. (32)
Proof. First we consider the case n = T ,
a1,T − β
T∑
i=2
ai,T =
βαT−2
2
− β
(
1
2
+
T−1∑
i=2
βαT−i−1
2
)
= αT−2 − 1− β
T−1∑
i=2
αT−i−1
= αT−2 − 1−
T−1∑
i=2
αT−i +
T−1∑
i=2
αT−i−1 = αT−2 − 1−
T−1∑
i=2
αT−i +
T∑
i=3
αT−i
= αT−2 − 1− αT−2 + 1 = 0.
Then we consider the case n 6= T ,
a1,n − β
T∑
i=2
ai,n = a1,n − β
n−1∑
i=2
ai,n − βan,n − β
T−1∑
i=n+1
ai,n − βaT,n. (33)
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We compute the sums separately.
β
n−1∑
i=2
ai,n =
n−1∑
i=2

β2θTnαn−i−1
2
+ β3
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−n−i


=
β2θTn
2
n−1∑
i=2
αn−i−1 + β3
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1
n−1∑
i=2
α2j−n−i
=
βθTn
2
(
n−1∑
i=2
αn−i −
n−1∑
i=2
αn−i−1
)
+ β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1
(
n−1∑
i=2
α2j−n−i+1 −
n−1∑
i=2
α2j−n−i
)
=
βθTn
2
(
αn−2 − 1)+ β2 T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1
(
α2j−n−1 − α2j−2n+1)
=
βθTnα
n−2
2
− βθ
T
n
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−n−1 − β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−2n+1
β
T−1∑
i=n+1
ain =
T−1∑
i=n+1

β2θTi αi−n−1
2
+ β3
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+1α
2j−i−n


=
β2α−n−1
2
T−1∑
i=n+1
θTi α
i + β3
T−1∑
j=n+1
j∑
i=n+1
θTj+1α
2j−i−n
=
β2α−n−1
2
T−1∑
i=n+1
θTi α
i + β2
T−1∑
j=n+1
θTj+1
(
j∑
i=n+1
α2j−i−n+1 −
j∑
i=n+1
α2j−i−n
)
=
β2α−n−1
2
(
(T − n)αn+1 − αT )+ β2 T−1∑
j=n+1
θTj+1
(
α2j−2n − αj−n) by Lemma 3.4,
=
β2(T − n)
2
− β
2αT−n−1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=n+1
θTj+1α
2j−2n − β2
T∑
j=n+2
θTj α
j−n−1
=
β2(T − n)
2
− β
2αT−n−1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=n+1
θTj+1α
2j−2n − β2α(T − n− 1) by Lemma 3.4.
The other terms in (33) are
a1,n =
βθTnα
n−2
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−n−1
βann =
β
2
+ β3
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−2n
βaTn =
β2αT−n−1
2
.
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Substituting these into (33):
a1,n − β
T∑
i=2
ai,n =
βθTnα
n−2
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−n−1 − βθ
T
nα
n−2
2
+
βθTn
2
− β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−n−1
+β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−2n+1 − β
2
− β3
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−2n − β
2(T − n)
2
+
β2αT−n−1
2
−β2
T−1∑
j=n+1
θTj+1α
2j−2n + β2α(T − n− 1)− β
2αT−n−1
2
=
β − β2(T − n)
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=n
θTj+1α
2j−2n − β
2
− β
2(T − n)
2
−β2
T−1∑
j=n+1
θTj+1α
2j−2n + β2α(T − n− 1)
= β2θTn+1 − β2(T − n) + β2α(T − n− 1)
= β2(θTn+1 − (T − n− α(T − n− 1))) = 0.
Definition 3.6. For a matrix A ∈ Rn×n let A(i, j) ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1) denote the appropriate minor
matrix of A, i.e. the matrix obtained by omitting the ith row and the jth column of A.
Lemma 3.7. We have
AT (1, 1) = AT−1. (34)
Proof. We denote the elements of AT (1, 1) and AT−1 by ui,k and vi,k, respectively.
ui,i = ai+1,i+1 =
1
2
β2
T−1∑
j=i+1
θTj+1α
2j−2(i+1) =
1
2
β2
T−2∑
j=i
θTj+2α
2j−2i
=
1
2
β2
T−2∑
j=i
θT−1j+1 α
2j−2i = vi,i 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 2,
ui,k = ai+1,k+1 =
βθTi+1α
i−k−1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=i+1
θTj+1α
2j−i−k−2
=
βθT−1i α
i−k−1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+2α
2j−i−k
=
βθT−1i α
i−k−1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=i
θT−1j+1 α
2j−i−k = vi,k 1 ≤ k < i ≤ T − 2,
uT−1,k = aT,k+1 =
βαT−(k+1)−1
2
=
βα(T−1)−k−1
2
= vT−1,k 1 ≤ k ≤ T − 2
uT−1,T−1 = aTT =
1
2
= vT−1,T−1
Lemma 3.8. For the determinant of AT , for all T ≥ 2, we have
detAT =
1 + β2(T − 1)
2
detAT−1. (35)
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Proof. We construct a matrix BT in such a way that we subtract the rows of AT multiplied by β
from the first row. Then, according to Lemma 3.5, in the first row of BT all elements expect the
first one (b1,1) are zero. Hence, using Lemma 3.7
detBT = b1,1 detBT (1, 1) =
(
a1,1 − β
T∑
i=2
ai,1
)
detAT (1, 1) =
(
a1,1 − β
T∑
i=2
ai,1
)
detAT−1.
We need to check that
a1,1 − β
T∑
i=2
ai,1 =
1 + β2(T − 1)
2
. (36)
Indeed,
β
T∑
i=2
ai,1 = β
T−1∑
i=2

βθTi αi−2
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=i
θTj+1α
2j−i−1

+ β2αT−2
2
=
β2α−2
2
T−1∑
i=2
θTi α
i + β3
T−1∑
j=2
j∑
i=2
θTj+1α
2j−i−1 +
β2αT−2
2
=
β2α−2
2
(
(T − 1)α2 − αT )+ β2 T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
2j−1(α− 1)
j∑
i=2
α−i +
β2αT−2
2
by Lemma 3.4,
=
β2(T − 1)
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
2j−1
(
j∑
i=2
α−i+1 −
j∑
i=2
α−i
)
=
β2(T − 1)
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
2j−1
(
α−1 − α−j)
=
β2(T − 1)
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
2j−2 − β2
T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
j−1
=
β2(T − 1)
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
2j−2 − β2
T∑
j=3
θTj α
j−2
=
β2(T − 1)
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
2j−2 − β2(T − 2)α by Lemma 3.4.
We substitute this into (36):
a1,1 − β
T∑
i=2
ai,1 =
1
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=1
θTj+1α
2j−2 − β
2(T − 1)
2
− β2
T−1∑
j=2
θTj+1α
2j−2 + β2(T − 2)α
=
1
2
+ β2θT2 −
β2(T − 1)
2
+ β2(T − 2)α
=
1
2
+ β2(T − 1− (T − 2)α) − β
2(T − 1)
2
+ β2(T − 2)α = 1 + β
2(T − 1)
2
.
Lemma 3.9. AT is positive definite and its determinant is
detAT =
1
2T
T−1∏
i=0
(
1 + β2i
)
for all T ≥ 1. (37)
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Proof. For T = 1, (37) gives 1/2. During the computation of φˆ11 we saw that the coefficient of the
quadratic term was indeed 1/2. Let’s assume that (37) holds for T − 1, namely
detAT−1 =
1
2T−1
T−2∏
i=0
(
1 + β2i
)
. (38)
Then
detAT =
1 + β2(T − 1)
2
detAT−1, by Lemma 3.8,
=
1 + β2(T − 1)
2
1
2T−1
T−2∏
i=0
(
1 + β2i
)
, by (38),
=
1
2T
T−1∏
i=0
(
1 + β2i
)
.
Since detAT > 0 for all T ≥ 1, Lemma 3.7 applies and the determinants of the matrices
[aij ]i=n,...,T ;j=n,...,T are positive for all 1 ≤ n ≤ T , thereforeAT is positive definite for all T ≥ 1.
Obviously, we can express detAT with the well-known Γ function.
Lemma 3.10. We have detAT = γβ(T )/2
T , where γβ is the function defined in 10. ✷
Later on we will need the value of p :=
(
A−1T
)
1,1
. Now we compute it using Lemmas 3.7 and
3.8:
p =
detAT (1, 1)
detAT
=
detAT−1
detAT
=
2
1 + β2(T − 1) . (39)
We need to compute the minimiser of (30). Note that in (30) only the exponent depends on φ,
so we can focus on this. Let
f(φ, z) :=
bT(φ, z)A−1T b(φ, z)
4
− c(φ, z). (40)
Then, we need to solve
∂φf(φ, z) =
∂φb
T(φ, z)A−1T b(φ, z)
2
− ∂φc(φ, z) = 0. (41)
From the definition a b(φ, z) and c(φ, z)
∂φb
T(φ, z) = (σ, 0, . . . , 0) , (42)
∂φc(φ, z) = βz. (43)
Note that we can write b(φ, z) as
b(φ, z) =
(
σφ− αz
σ
)
e1 +
2αz
σ
AT (:, 1), (44)
where e1 = (1, 0 . . . , 0)
T, and AT (:, 1) is the first column of AT . Let’s substitute (42), (43) and
(44) into (41):
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(σ, 0, . . . , 0)A−1T
[(
σφ− αz
σ
)
e1 +
2αz
σ
AT (:, 1)
]
− 2βz = 0
σA−1T (1, :)
[(
σφ− αz
σ
)
e1 +
2αz
σ
AT (:, 1)
]
− 2βs0 = 0(
σ2φ− 2αz) p+ 2αz − 2βz = 0
σ2φ− αz = −2z
p
σ2φ− αz = − (1 + β2(T − 1)) z by (39), hence
φ =
βz
σ2
(1− (T − 1)β)
φ =
βz
σ2
θT1 .
We can see from the above calculation that this φ is a global minimiser of f for a given z.
Hence the minimiser φ for (24) is
φ = φˆT1 (z) =
βz
σ2
θT1 ,
and we have proved the first part Theorem 2.1 in the case of using past information. As we have
found explicit optimal strategies for the expected utility problem, we can now turn to (8) and
(11).
First we compute the maximal conditional expected utility which is
E
[
U
(
Lφ
∗
T
)
|X0 = z
]
= − 1√
γβ(T )
ef(φˆ
T
1 (z),z) by (30), Lemma 3.10 and (40). (45)
Let fˆ(z) := f
(
φˆT1 (z), z
)
, bˆ(z) := b
(
φˆT1 (z), z
)
and cˆ(z) := c
(
φˆT1 (z), z
)
.
First we compute bˆT(z)A−1T bˆ(z):
bˆT(z)A−1T bˆ(z) =
[
2αz
σ
AT (:, 1) − z
σ
(
1 + (T − 1)β2) e1]TA−1T
·
[
2αz
σ
AT (:, 1) − z
σ
(
1 + (T − 1)β2) e1] by (44),
=
[
2αz
σ
(1, 0, . . . , 0)− z
σ
(
1 + (T − 1)β2)A−1T (1, :)
]
·
[
2αz
σ
AT (:, 1) − z
σ
(
1 + (T − 1)β2) e1] ,
=
z2
σ2
((
1 + β2(T − 1))2 p− 4α (1 + β2(T − 1))+ 4α2a1,1)
=
z2
σ2
(
2
(
1 + β2(T − 1))− 4α (1 + β2(T − 1)) + 4α2a1,1) by (39).
For fˆ(z)
fˆ(z) =
bˆT(z)A−1T bˆ(z)
4
− cˆ(z)
=
z2
σ2

(1 + β2(T − 1))
2
− α (1 + β2(T − 1)) + α2a1,1 − β(1− (T − 1)β) − β2 T∑
j=2
θTj α
2j−2


=
z2
σ2

(1 + β2(T − 1))
2
− α (1 + β2(T − 1)) + α2
2
+ β2
T−1∑
j=1
θTj+1α
2j − β(1 − (T − 1)β)− β2
T∑
j=2
θTj α
2j−2


= −β
2z2
2σ2
T.
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Hence the maximal achievable conditional expected utility is
E
[
U
(
Lφ
∗
T
)
|X0 = z
]
= − 1√
γβ(T )
e−
β2z2
2σ2
T , (46)
and we have proved (8). Now we prove (11). For stable processes, in case of var(Xt) = 1 for all
t ≥ 0
1 = var(Xt) = var

σ +∞∑
j=0
αjεt−j

 = σ2 +∞∑
j=0
α2j =
σ2
1− α2 ,
therefore σ2 = 1− α2. As X0 is N(0, 1), the maximal expected utility can be found using (27):
E
[
U
(
Lφ
∗
T
)]
= E
[
E
[
U
(
Lφ
∗
T
)
|X0
]]
= E
[
− 1√
γβ(T )
e−
β2X20
2σ2
T
]
= − 1√
2πγβ(T )
∫
R
e−
β2x2
2σ2
T−x
2
2 dx = − 1√
γβ(T )
(
β2T
1−α2 + 1
)
= −
√
β + 2
(2− (T − 1)β) γβ(T ) ,
so we have proved (11).
Now we focus on the case where the strategies depend only on the initial value X0 of the
autoregressive process. In this case using the strategy η = (η1, . . . , ηT ) we get
LηT =
T∑
j=1
ηj (Xj −Xj−1)
=
T∑
j=1
ηj
(
αj−1βX0 + σεj + σβ
j−1∑
k=1
αj−1−kεk
)
= βX0
T∑
j=1
ηjαj−1 + σ
T∑
j=1
ηjεj + βσ
T∑
j=1
j−1∑
k=1
ηjα
j−k−1εk
= βX0
T∑
j=1
ηjαj−1 + σ
T∑
j=1
ηjεj + βσ
T∑
k=1
εk
T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1.
Let c : RT → R, and b : RT → RT , where
c(η) = βX0
T∑
j=1
ηjα
j−1, and bk(η) = σεk + βσ
T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1, 1 ≤ k ≤ T.
Using the notation LηT = c(η) + b
T(η)ε we get from Lemma 3.2 that
E
[
U
(
LηT
) |X0] = −eg(η), where g(η) = −c(η) + bT(η)b(η)
2
. (47)
We need to solve the system of equations ∇g(η) = 0. We denote these equations by (Ek),
where 1 ≤ k ≤ T :
0 =
∂g
∂ηk
(η) = −X0βαk−1 + bT(η) ∂b
∂ηk
(η). (Ek)
The partial derivatives of b are:
(
∂b
∂ηk
(η)
)
l
=


σβαk−l−1 if l < k
σ if l = k
0 if l > k.
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Hence we have
bT(η)
∂b
∂ηk
(η) = σβ
k−1∑
l=1
αk−l−1

σηl + σβ T∑
j=l+1
ηjα
j−l−1

+ σ2ηk + σ2β T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1
= σ2β
k−1∑
l=1
ηlα
k−l−1 + σ2β2
k−1∑
l=1
T∑
j=l+1
ηjα
j+k−2l−2 + σ2ηk + σ
2β
T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1.
Therefore the equations Ek take the form
β
k−1∑
l=1
ηlα
k−l−1 + β2
k−1∑
l=1
T∑
j=l+1
ηjα
j+k−2l−2 + ηk + β
T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1 =
X0
σ2
βαk−1.
Let k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T − 1}. Then for Ek+1 we have
β
k∑
l=1
ηlα
k−l + β2
k∑
l=1
T∑
j=l+1
ηjα
j+k−2l−1 + ηk+1 + β
T∑
j=k+2
ηjα
j−k−2 =
X0
σ2
βαk.
We define equation Fk for 1 ≤ k ≤ T − 1 by substract equation Ek multiplied by α from equation
Ek+1, so we get
0 = βηk + β
2
T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1 + ηk+1 − αηk + β
T∑
j=k+2
ηjα
j−k−2 − β
T∑
j=k+1
ηkα
j−k,
0 = ηk+1 − ηk + β

 T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k −
T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1

+ β T∑
j=k+2
ηjα
j−k−2 − β
T∑
j=k+1
ηkα
j−k,
0 = ηk+1 − ηk − β
T∑
j=k+1
ηjα
j−k−1 + β
T∑
j=k+2
ηjα
j−k−2,
0 = ηk+1 − ηk − βηk+1 + β
T∑
j=k+2
ηjα
j−k−2(1− α),
0 = (1− β)ηk+1 − ηk − β2
T∑
j=k+2
ηjα
j−k−2.
Lemma 3.11. For the solutions of the system Fk, k = 1, . . . , T − 1,
ηk = θ
T
k ηT = (1− (T − k)β)ηT (48)
hold, for all k = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Proof. First we consider the equation Ft−1,
0 = (1− β)ηT − ηT−1
ηT−1 = θ
T
T−1ηT
Let’s assume that (48) holds for l = k + 1, . . . , T − 1. Considering the equation Fk, using
Lemma 3.4 we get
0 = (1− β)ηk+1 − ηk − β2
T∑
j=k+2
ηjα
j−k−2,
0 = (1− β)(1 − (T − k − 1)β)ηT − ηk − β2
T∑
j=k+2
θTj ηTα
j−k−2,
0 = (1− β)(1 − (T − k − 1)β)ηT − ηk − β2(T − k − 1)ηT ,
ηk = (1− (T − k − 1)β − β)ηT ,
ηk = θ
T
k ηT .
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Because of θTT = 1, ηT = θ
T
T ηT also holds. To prove the first part of Theorem 2.1 for the case
without using past information, we only need to show that ηT = β
X0
σ2
.
Substituting (48) into ET ,
β
T−1∑
l=1
θlηTα
T−l−1 + β2
T−1∑
l=1
T∑
j=l+1
θTj ηTα
j+T−2l−2 + ηT =
X0
σ2
βαT−1 (49)
We compute the two sums separately,
T−1∑
l=1
θTl α
T−l−1 =
T−1∑
l=1
(T + 1− l − (T − l)α)αT−l−1 =
T−1∑
l=1
(T + 1− l)αT−l−1 −
T−1∑
l=1
(T − l)αT−l
=
T∑
l=2
(T + 2− l)αT−l −
T−1∑
l=1
(T − l)αT − l =
T∑
l=2
2αT−l − (T − 1)αT−1;
β
T−1∑
l=1
T∑
j=l+1
θTj α
j+T−2l−2 = β
T−1∑
l=1
αT−2l−2
T∑
j=l+1
θTj α
j = β
T−1∑
l=1
(T − l)αT−l−1
=
T−1∑
l=1
(T − l)αT−l −
T−1∑
l=1
(T − l)αT−l−1 =
T−1∑
l=1
(T − l)αT−l −
T∑
l=2
(T − l + 1)αT−l
= −
T∑
l=2
αT−l + (T − 1)αT−1.
Hence, from ET : (
1 + β
T∑
l=2
αT−l
)
ηT = α
T−lβ
X0
σ2(
1 +
T∑
l=2
αT−l+1 −
T∑
l=2
αT−l
)
ηT = α
T−lβ
X0
σ2
αT−1ηT = α
T−lβ
X0
σ2
ηT = β
X0
σ2
.
So we have proved the firs part of Theorem 2.1. Now we prove (9). First we compute the element
of bˆ := b(ηˆ), using Lemma 3.4,
bˆk =
βX0
σ
θk +
β2X0
σ
T∑
j=k+1
θjα
j−k−1 =
βX0
σ
(1− (T − k)β) + β
2X0
σ
(T − k) = βX0
σ
. (50)
Therefore bˆTbˆ =
β2X20
σ2
T , and cˆ := c(ηˆ) =
β2X20
σ2
∑T
j=1 θjα
j−1 =
β2X20
σ2
T , by Lemma 3.4. Hence, using
(47), we get E
[
U
(
LηˆT
)
|X0
]
= e−
β2X20
2σ2
T
, which proves (9). Based on the same calculation that we
did to get (11) from (8), we get (12) from (9).
The only statment of Theorem 2.1 left to prove is the forth part. For β = 0, the statement is
trivial. For the other case, using y(T ) := T − 1 + 1
β2
, we get
γβ(T )
hβ(T )
=
β2TΓ(y(T ) + 1)
(β2)
1− 1
β2
√
2πy(T )
(
β2y(T )
e
)T−1+ 1
β2
=
Γ (y(T ) + 1)√
2πy(T )
(
y(T )
e
)y(T ) , (51)
and it is well-known that this expression tends to 1 if T (and hence also y(T )) tend to infinity.
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